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h i g h l i g h t s
• We assess empirically if non-profit crowdfunding projects are unusually successful.
• Within our database, we classify more than 2000 projects as non-profits.
• They receive higher average pledges and are more likely to reach their funding goals.
• Yet, they also obtain lower total funding amounts and have fewer funding providers.
• A small number of very successful for-profit projects is important for the results.
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a b s t r a c t
Weusedata fromapproximately 50,000 crowdfundingprojects to assess the relative fundingperformance
of for-profit and non-profit campaigns. We find that non-profit projects are significantly more likely to
reach theirminimum funding goals and that they receivemoremoney from the average funding provider.
At the same time, however, they have fewer funding providers and obtain lower total funding amounts.
Our analysis shows that these results are driven by a small number of very successful for-profit projects.
We argue that the findings are consistent with a simple selection mechanism in which entrepreneurs
make the non-profit/for-profit decision based on expected project payoffs.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Over the past 5 years, crowd-based financing has seen steady
growth and also started to attract academic attention.1 One of the
most interesting findings of the existing literature on crowdfund-
ing is reported by Belleflamme et al. (2013). Motivated by a model
with contract failure, they collect data from 44 projects and show
that non-profit campaigns appear to have above-average success
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 935421621.
E-mail address: stefan.pitschner@upf.edu (S. Pitschner).
1 For example Agrawal et al. (2011, 2013), Belleflamme et al. (2013), Gerber et al.
(2012), Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2013), Lehner (2013) and Mollick (2014).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.022
0165-1765/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articat raising funds from the crowd.2 This paper revisits their find-
ing using a large dataset of approximately 50,000 crowdfunding
campaigns, more than 2,000 of which we classify as non-profits.
The total funding amount provided to the projects in our database
sums up to more than 413 million US Dollars.
In terms of the average amount received per funding provider
and the probability of reaching the desired funding goal, we con-
firm that non-profits are more successful. However, the picture re-
2 Read (2013) presents a similar finding considering 216 crowdfunding projects.
In related work, Elfenbein and Fisman (2012) use data from eBay to show that
charitable behavior of sellers can serve as a substitute for seller reputation. Also
see McManus and Bennet (2011), who study how charitable product features can
affect consumer demand.
le under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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and the total funding amount in dollars.We show that this reversed
finding is driven by a small number of extremely successful for-
profit campaigns, represented by the very right end of the success
distribution. We argue that this is consistent with entrepreneurs
running those projects for profit that have the highest expected
overall payoffs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces the dataset and discusses how we identify non-profit
projects. In Section 3, we present the empirical results. Section 4
concludes.
2. Dataset and definition of non-profit projects
The data used in this paper is from the public archive of the
crowdfunding website kickstarter.com. We used the website’s
search function with 300 of the most common English words and
considered the projects these searches returned. Overall, we use
data from 50,861 crowdfunding campaigns that ended between
2009 and 2013. Out of these, we eliminate a small number of out-
liers and then keep all thosewhose locationwaswithin the US, and
whose funding period had already ended.3 This leaves uswith a to-
tal of 46,888 campaigns.
Given the large number of observations, we chose to identify
non-profits by text-searching the descriptions of each project.
More precisely, we set a non-profit indicator variable equal to 1
for all projects whose descriptions contain at least one occurrence
of a variant of the word ‘‘non-profit’’.4 Generally speaking, our
dataset is constructed to contain only variables that can clearly be
classified as either controls or outcomes. For example, the analysis
does not use variables such as a project’s number of social media
followers or its number of project updates. Since such measures
are likely influenced by both the initial set up of a given campaign
and its success, their inclusion in our regressions could cause
endogeneity problems. Our measures of funding success comprise
a dummy variable for reaching the desired funding goal, the total
number of funding providers, the total dollar amount provided,
and the average dollar amount supplied per funding provider.
The control variables are briefly discussed below. Table 1 contains
some descriptive statistics of the dataset.
3. Empirical results
This section contains the empirical results. We begin with
an introductory graphical analysis and then turn to multivariate
regressions.
3.1. Graphical analysis
Our graphical analysis is based on the percentiles of three of
the quantitative success measures. Since all three of these vari-
ables turn out to reach very large values at the right ends of their
distributions, we display the percentile ranges 1–95 and 96–100
3 We performed these searches in September 2013. Outliers are identified based
on two criteria. First, we drop campaigns with extremely low or unrealistically high
funding goals. For the upper and lower bounds we follow Mollick (2014) and use
$100 and $1,000,000, respectively. Second, we eliminate all campaigns whose text
descriptions contain fewer than 10 words. All results reported below are, however,
qualitatively robust to the inclusion of these outliers.
4 The variants we check for are ‘‘non-profit’’, ‘‘non profit’’, ‘‘nonprofit’’, ‘‘not-for-
profit’’ and ‘‘not for profit’’. To assess the accuracy of this approach, we manually
check random samples with n = 50 for each of the two automatically assigned
categories. For these samples, we find that 46 out of 50 non-profit labels and 47
out of 50 for-profit labels were correctly assigned. This suggests that our non-profit
variable captures the desired concept relatively well.in separate plots. As Fig. 1 shows, for the percentiles 1–99 and all
three measures, non-profit projects reach higher values than the
for-profit ones. However, at the very right ends of the distributions
this behavior changes. Here, for-profit projects outperform by very
large margins. These findings suggest that non-profit projects do
not consistently obtain more funding than for-profit ones.
3.2. Regression analysis
Next, we turn to the regression analysis. Apart from the three
success measures already considered above, we now also use a
dummy variable indicating that a project successfully reached the
desired minimum funding goal. All of our specifications are esti-
mated using OLS and of the following form:
si = c + βdinon-profit + γ X i + ϵ i. (1)
Here, si denotes the given success measure of project i, dinon-profit is
the indicator variable for non-profit projects and X i is a vector of
project-specific control variables. For those regressions using the
funding goal dummy as the dependent variable, the specification
corresponds to a linear probability model. Motivated by the find-
ings from the graphical analysis above, we run two different re-
gressions for each one of the success measures. While the first one
always uses the entire sample of all 46,888 projects, the second one
excludes the top 1% in terms of funding success.5 This allows us to
assess their role in the full sample results.
While our regressions do not warrant a causal interpretation, the
control variables do account for many important characteristics
that could be systematically different between for-profit and non-
profit campaigns. In particular, we control for the funding goal, the
minimum funding amount, the number of words contained in the
project description, and the campaign duration in days. In addition,
we also use dummy sets for the product categories, the campaign
locations and the timing of the campaign ends.6
As Table 2 shows, we find that non-profit projects are more
likely to reach their predefined funding goals and that their aver-
age amount received per funding provider is higher. For the other
two success measures, however, the picture looks different. Here,
our full sample regressions suggest that it is actually the group of
for-profit projects that is more successful. On average, for-profit
projects have more funding providers and receive higher total
funding amounts in dollars. To understand this finding better, we
can consider the regressions that exclude the 1% ofmost successful
projects: given that the sign on the non-profit dummy is signifi-
cantly positive in these regressions, we conclude that the apparent
for-profit advantage is driven by a small group of very successful
campaigns.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have used data from approximately 50,000
crowdfunding projects to assess the relative funding performance
of for-profit and non-profit campaigns. Our results suggest that
non-profit projects receive more money per funding provider and
that they are more likely to reach their minimum funding goals.
On average, however, they also have fewer funding providers and
obtain lower total funding amounts. One possible explanation for
5 We define these most successful products in terms of the number of funding
providers, but the results are robust to using the total dollar amount of funding
instead. Weighted specifications that take differences in the ratio of successful vs.
unsuccessful campaigns into account also yield similar results.
6 The location dummy set is defined at the level of US federal states, and the
number of product categories is 51. The campaign ending times are captured by a
set of year–month dummies. All of themain results are robust to excluding product
categories that do not contain at least 20 non-profit projects.
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Descriptive statistics.
Dependent variable Min Max Mean Median Stdev Skewness Kurtosis Observations
Funding goal
Non-Profit 100 600,000 14755 5,500 35543 9.1923 120.46 2,099
For-Profit 100 1,000,000 11918 4,500 36314 13.43 265.94 44,789
Minimum pledge
Non-profit 1 7,000 12.428 5 159.05 41.358 1788 2,099
For-profit 1 10,000 9.077 5 103.1 86.886 8129.1 44,789
Number of words
Non-profit 51 5,286 802.88 626 613.51 2.2675 10.955 2,099
For-profit 10 6,052 608.14 445 556.98 2.9292 16.403 44,789
Campaign duration (days)
Non-profit 3 90 36.495 30 15.501 1.3344 5.1365 2,099
For-profit 2 90 35.749 30 14.925 1.36 5.4142 44,789
The total number of projects is 46,888. Non-profit projects are those whose descriptions contain at least one occurrence of a variant of the word ‘‘non-profit’’.Table 2
Regression results.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Funding goal reached Avg. funding amount # of funding providers Total amount pledged
(in 1000 USD)
Top 1 % included Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Non-profit 0.064*** 0.063*** 7.988*** 7.527*** −58.485*** 10.718*** −4.101*** 1.347***
(6.406) (6.325) (4.263) (4.003) (−4.701) (3.280) (−4.302) (3.925)
Funding goal −0.002*** −0.002*** 0.242*** 0.311*** 6.948*** 0.221*** 0.561*** 0.058***
(in 1000 USD) (−15.368) (−15.883) (7.366) (7.269) (4.018) (6.098) (3.645) (8.621)
Minimum pledge −0.090*** −0.082*** 219.611*** 218.289*** −43.294** −11.868*** −3.053* −0.931***
(in 1000 USD) (−4.411) (−4.028) (7.373) (7.340) (−2.033) (−3.590) (−1.656) (−2.955)
# Words 0.144*** 0.127*** 15.810*** 17.542*** 257.118*** 82.140*** 21.489*** 8.067***
(in 1000) (30.983) (25.823) (13.248) (13.599) (11.536) (33.187) (11.183) (25.662)
Duration −4.114*** −4.050*** 178.796*** 162.721*** −1,661.363*** 4.075 −91.511** 22.675***
(in 1000 days) (−26.169) (−25.691) (5.274) (4.770) (−3.866) (0.117) (−2.457) (6.070)
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Category FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46888 46421 43969 43502 46888 46421 46888 46421
R2 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.10 0.19
Parentheses contain t-statistics based on robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote the statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. A constant term is
included but not reported.Fig. 1. Success measure percentiles of for-profit and non-profit projects.
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trepreneurs have at least some knowledge about a given project’s
payoffs, they also know something about how much they would
forgo by running that particular project as a non-profit. Thus, all
else equal, the higher a project’s expected payoffs, the higher the
entrepreneur’s incentive to run it as a for-profit.
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